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FEDERAL MODIFICATION OF STATE LAW:
ERIE AND THE BANKRUPTCY STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS*
FnimERA courts, particularly when sitting as courts of equity, have long
wrestled with the temptation to apply federal doctrines to modify state law.
A federal court may be referred to state law either by the general directive
of the Rules of Decision Act' or by the specific terms of a federal statute
pertinent to a particular cause of action.2 In the absence of a federal ques-
tion,3 Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins 4 interpreted the Rules of Decision Act
in diversity cases to demand a federal result identical with that which the
state court would reach, and thus entirely precluded federal modification
of state law.5 But where federal courts are referred to state law in non-
diversity suits,0 there is no automatic guide for determining whether such
reference is also meant to require absolute federal adherence to the totality
*Austrian v. Williams, 198 F2d 697 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 73 Sup. Ct. 323 (1952).
As this issue went to press, other Notes appeared in 33 B.U.L. Rnv. 109 (1953), 53 CoL
L. REv. 118 (1953), 66 H.Luv. L. Ra. 527 (1953). 101 U. oF P.,. L. Ry.% 561 (1953).
1. "The laws of the several states. except where the Constitution or treaties of the
United States or Acts of Congress otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules
of decision in civil actions in the courts of the United States, in cases where they apply."
J UDiCARY AcT OF 1869, § 34, 1 STAT. 92 (1S69), as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (Supp.
1952). E.g., Davis Warehouse Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 144 (1944) (OPA Act-vhat
is a public utility?); Campbell v. Haverhill, 155 U.S. 610 (1&95) (patents--statutes of
limitation).
2. E.g., BANKRuprcy AcT, § 11(e), 52 STAT. 849 (1933), 11 U.S.C. § 29(e) (1946)
(statutes of limitations); F. Ar LABOR STANP.D=s ACT, § 218, 52 STrAr. 1069 (1933), 29
U.S.C. § 218 (1946) (federal la, no ground for disregarding state law).
3. Under the "supremacy clause;' U.S. CoIzsT. Art VI, § 2, a federal question Vill
be governed by federal law regardless of the basis for federal jurisdiction.
4. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
5. The Erie doctrine applies whether the cause is at law or at equity. Ruhlin v.
New York Life Ins. Co., 304 U.S. 202 (1933). For various applications of the doctrine,
see, e.g., Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S. 183 (1947) (res judicata); Guaranty Trust C.'.
of New York v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945) (statute of limitations). See 1.vor, Comi-
mm R~Y ox Tm U.S. JuDirCAL CoDo 315-40 (19491) (hereinafter cited as Mo , Com-
=TARY). Diversity jurisdiction is based on U.S. Coisr. Art. III, § 2; and 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332 (Supp. 1952).
6. Such federal jurisdiction arises under U.S. Co.sT. Art. II1, §2, and requires in
addition, either the general federal question jurisdictional grant of 28 U.S.C. § 1331
(Supp. 1948) or a special federal question jurisdictional grant containvd in many differ-
ent congressional enactments-e.g., 35 ST.AT. 66 (1903), as amended, 45 U.S.C. § 5t
(Supp. 1948) (FELA) ; 43 STAT. 86 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 77(vI (a) (Securities Act);
48 STAT. 172 (1933), 49 STAT. 692 (1935), 12 U.S.C. § 264(j) (4) (FDICA). To meet
the requirements of the jurisdictional grant of § 1331, a right created by federal law
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of state law, statutory and decisional. 7 Litigation arising in non-diversity
cases under the Bankruptcy Act aptly illustrates the general problem, since
the Act authorizes frequent resort to state law 8 and at the same time under-
scores the discretionary equitable jurisdiction of the bankruptcy courtY
Recently, Austrian v. Williams 10 determined the authority of federal courts
to invoke federal equitable doctrines that conflict with local interpretations
of state statutes of limitations 11 applicable under Section 11 (e) of the Bank-
ruptcy Act.12 Austrian, as trustee for a corporation in reorganization tinder
Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act,13 brought an action under Section 70(a)
of the Bankruptcy Act, which vests in the trustee the title to the bankrupt's
must be shown to be in issue in the complaint itself. Gully v. First Nat. Bank in Meridian,
299 U.S. 109 (1936). But the special federal question jurisdictional grant allows a
litigant to come into federal court regardless of the origin of his cause of action. See
Nat. Mutual Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 614 (1949) (concurring
opinion). See MooR, COmm[NTARY 135-48.
7. Where a federally-created right is in issue, there is no doubt that state law may
be modified. E.g., Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392 (1946); Rawlings v. Ray, 312
U.S. 96 (1941); Russell v. Todd, 309 U.S. 280 (1940). But the extent of such modi-
fication is not clear. Compare Glenn Coal Co. v. Dickinson Fuel Co., 72 F,2d 885 (4th
Cir. 1934), with Hoskins Coal & Dock Corp. v. Truax Traer Coal Co., 191 F2d 912
(7th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 947 (1952). Where a state-created right is heard
under non-diversity jurisdiction, the Supreme Court has refused to lay down a general
rule as to either the possibility or the extent of federal modification of state law.
D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corp., 315 U.S. 447 (1942), For
differences in modification stemming from the- legal or equitable nature of the cause
of action, see note 21 infra.
8. For discussion and examples see MooRE, CommENTARY 351-6.
9. See 1 CoLuaR oN BANKRUPTCY 162 (14th ed. 1940).
10. 198 F.2d 697 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 73 Sup. Ct. 328 (1952).
11. Statutes of limitations may affect either the remedy or bar the right itself. If a
statute of limitations bars the right, it is subject to no modification whatsoever; the
right is absolutely extinguished at the expiration of a certain period. McCluny v.
Silliman, 3 Pet. 270 (U.S. 1830); Wilson v. Massengill, 124 F.2d 666 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 316 U.S. 686 (1942); Moran v. Harrison, 91 F.2d 310 (D.C. Cir. ), ecrt. denied,
302 U.S. 740 (1937). If a statute of limitations is remedial, it is subject to modification.
Maid v. George R. Cooke Co., 124 F.2d 663 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 316 U.S. 686 (1942);
Martin v. Wilson, 120 Fed. 202 (7th Cir. 1903). Federal courts consider statutes of
limitation presumptively remedial. Chase Securities Corp. v. Donalson, 325 U.S. 304
(1945); Campbell v. Holt, 115 U.S. 620 (1885).
12. The section reads: "A receiver or trustee may, within two years subsequent
to the date of adjudication or within such further period of time as the federal or state
law may permit, institute proceedings in behalf of the estate upon any claim against
which the -period of limitation fixed by Federal or State law had not expired at the
time of the filing of the petition in bankruptcy. . . ." 52 STAT. 849 (1938), 11 U.S.C,
§ 29(e) (1946).
Section 11(e) applies to both bankruptcy and reorganization proceedings. Hereafter,
"bankruptcy" will be used to include "reorganization." However, the interpretation of
the section may not be identical for both kinds of cases. See note 48 in ra.
13. 52 STAT. 883-905 (1938), 11 U.S.C. §§ 501-676 (1946).
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property including choses of action under state law.1 4 Suit was instituted
against corporate directors and the chief stockholder. Williams, for an ac-
counting and breach of fiduciary duty. The trustee alleged that Williams and
his hand-picked board of directors, fiduciaries of the debtor corporation, had
siphoned from it in 1927 and 1929 over $10 million for Williams' personal
benefit. The trustee further alleged that Williams had retained his dominant
status for fifteen years, thus concealing the breach of fiduciary duty until the
trustee took over in 1942.'- Under Section 11(e) of the Bankruptcy Act,
suit by a trustee to recover assets of the corporate debtor is allowed only
if "not barred by ... state law ...at the time of the filing of the petition
in bankruptcy."'" Courts of New York, the forum state,17 had held that
an action for breach of fiduciary duty is governed by a ten-year residual
statute of limitations running from the time of the occurrence of the wrongful
acts, rather than by the six-year fraud statute which by its terms does not
begin to run until the discovery of the fraud.' 8 Hence, prior to the filing
of the petition in bankruptcy, a suit by the debtor corporation would have
been barred under New York law. If "state law" in Section 11(e) was
meant to bind federal courts categorically to state statutes and decisions
interpreting them, the suit by the trustee would likewise be barred. But the
federal district court felt that it had the power to modify the New York
courts' interpretation of their statutes.' 9 Once having decided its freedom
to depart from state decisional law, it found justification for exercising this
power in the particular facts of the Austrian case. The combination of de-
fendants' fraudulent conduct and Williams' continued dominance was held
to warrant application of the federal doctrine of Bailey v. Glozc; '4 J which
suspends the running of a statute of limitations until the possibility of dis-
14. 30 STAT. 565 (1593), as amended, 52 STAT. 879 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 110(a)
(1946).
15. The facts of the case are set out in detail in Austrian v. William,, 103 r. suP.
64, 76-110 (1952).
16. See note 12 supra.
17. According to established rules of conflicts of law, the applicable statute of linfita-
tions is always that of the forum. GoWLMCH, CoxFLCrs OF L1 24 (3d ed. P4)).
18. E.g., Hastings v. H. M. Byllesby & Co., 293 N.Y. 404, 57 N.F.2d 733 (1944),
affirming 263 App. Div. 653, 40 N.Y.S.2d 307 (lst Dep't 1943) ; Druckerman v. Harbord,
31 N.Y.S2d 867 (Sup. Ct. 1940). See N.Y. Civ. PR.1cr. AcT § 53 (residual statute Qf
limitations), and §48(5) (fraud) (1941).
19. Austrian v. Williams, 103 F. Supp. 64, 110-17 (1952). Judge Weinfeld pointed
out that the Erie doctrine had been confined to diversity cases, and that jurisdiction here
was not based on diversity. In examining the nature and purpoe of bankruptcy juris-
diction, especially its equitable basis, the court found no reason for extension of the
Erie doctrine. Moreover, the court read in the trustee's broad powers to uncover
corporate management abuses a congressional purpose to achieve national uniformity in
the enforcement of Chapter X, independent of the vagaries of service of process. Thus,
the court thought, there was a need for uniformity of accrual doctrines, which would
necessitate modification of state law hi this case. See Note, 38 VA. L Rkv. t0 (1952).
20. 21 Wall. 342 (U.S. 1874).
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covery of "fraud. 12 1 This doctrine, superimposed upon the state statute, de-
layed accrual of the cause of action until the filing of the petition in bank-
ruptcy. Hence the trustee's suit was allowed.
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed.2 2 Judge Chase,
speaking for the majority, conceded that jurisdiction in Austrian was not
based on diversity,23 a fact which the lower court had stressed. 24 Neverthe-
less, he found "other reasons" to apply state decisional law to the exclusion
of federal equitable principles in the concurrence of the express words "state
law" with a state-created cause of action. Section 11(e)'s explicit reference
to state law, the court argued, indicated a clear congressional intent that the
state's "entire comprehensive statutory scheme" of limitations, including
state court decisions on such matters as accrual, should be controlling.Y
And while the Supreme Court in Holmberg v. Armbrecht 20 had used the
federal accrual doctrine of Bailey v. Glover to modify state decisions interpret-
ing state limitations statutes, the court distinguished Holmberg on the ground
that it had involved a federally-created cause of action .2  But the court was
unclear why the distinction between a federally-created cause of action and
the state-created cause in Austrian was relevant. On the one hand, the
opinion may be taken at face value to enunciate a principle that federal
courts enforcing state-created rights cannot modify them. However the
opinion may also be interpreted to suggest two grounds for a distinction based
21. The cause of action must first be qualified as one of "fraud" to fall within
the Bailey doctrine. However, "fraud" for this purpose is broader than the common
law meaning of the term. For example, both the existence of a constructive trust rela-
tionship between directors and a corporation-Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 306 (1939)
-and the domination of the corporation by the alleged wrongdoer-Dabney v. Levy, 191
F.2d 201 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 887 (1951); Michelsen v. Penney, 135 F.2d
409 (2d Cir. 1943)-aid in such classification. See Note, Thc Statute of Limtitations in
Stockholders' Derivative Suit against Directors, 39 CoL L. RzEV. 842 (1939).
The doctrine of Bailey v. Glover is one of the basic federal equitable principles which
is applied even when the jurisdiction of equity is merely concurrent, i.e., when equity
is acting in aid of a legal right. Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 397 (1946);
see Russell v. Todd, 309 U.S. 280, 288 n.1 (1940). Contra: Wells v. Place, 92 F. Supp.
477 (N.D. Ohio 1950). If the cause of action is purely equitable, modification of
accrual may be achieved through a federal doctrine of laches, since the court may not be
required to refer to any limitations statutes at all. But often the state statute will still
be adopted by analogy where to do so will produce an equitable result. Russell v. Todd,
309 U.S. 280 (1940). Where an action is purely legal, there is considerable doubt
whether courts may modify state statutes of limitation except where the accrual can
be linked to the act of a federal official. Rawlings v. Ray, 312 U.S. 96 (1941). See
Blume & George, Limitations and the Federal Courts, 49 Mxcii. L. Rv. 937 (1951).
22. Austrian v. Williams, 198 F.2d 697 (2d Cir. 1952). The court voted two to one,
Judge Clark dissenting.
23. Id. at 700.
24. See note 19 stupra.
25. Austrian v. Williams, 198 F.2d 697, 701 (2d Cir. 1952).
26. 327 U.S. 392 (1946).
27. Austrian v. Williams, 198 F.2d 697, 701-2 (2d Cir. 1952).
[Vol. 62
NO TES
on the origin of the rights. Despite the court's explicit repudiation of the
application of the Erie rationale,28 both the majority and the dissent may be
read to imply that the court did in fact assume the reasoning behind Eric:
that litigants enforcing state-created rights in federal courts should have these
rights determined precisely as they would be determined in a state court in
order to avoid discrimination against parties who cannot exercise the same
choice of forum.29 In addition, the court hints that the emphasis on the state
derivation of the claim is an attempt to carry over the concept, found else-
where in the Bankruptcy Act, that the trustee succeeds only to the rights of
the debtor prior to reorganization.3 0
Contrary to the opinion of the Court of Appeals, Section 11(e) does not
provide a clear mandate precluding federal modification of state law. The
court's inference from the wording of Section 11(e) can be understood
either as a common sense reading of the word "law" or as deduction from
the express reference to state law in the section. Certainly, to read "law" to
make both statutory and judicial pronouncements controlling is in itself a
reasonable interpretation. 31 And the fact that Congress chose to make an
express reference to state law, when state limitations statutes had previously
been applied under the Rules of Decision Act,3 2 suggests that Congress
meant to exclude federal doctrines. But both these interpretations are of
dubious validity in light of the history of Section 11(e). The section was
passed by the House of Representatives in 1937, before Erie, and by the
Senate in 1938, shortly after Erie.33 Thus the directive to look to state law
28. Id. at 700.
29. The majority finds its sole support in a case distinguishing between the origins
of a cause of action on the basis of the Erie rationale. Id. at 701-2. The fact that the
dissent was almost entirely directed against extending the Eric doctrine further suggests
that Erie was a major factor in the majority decision. Id. at 702-3.
30. Id. at 701, and n.6. For discussion of sections limiting the trustee's rights to
those of the debtor, see 4 CoLLIER oN BANKRUPTCY '70.04, pp. 943-51 (14th ed. 1942);
and cases cited note 46 infra.
31. "[T]he law, with respect to any particular set of facts, is a decibion of a court
with respect to those facts so far as that decision affects that particular person." Fr:.u,
LAw AND THE MODERN MIND 46 (1930). Courts have repeatedly btated the proposition
that a suit should be governed by the law which created it. Harrigan v. Bergdoll, 270 U.S.
560, 564 (1925); American Well Works Co. v. Layne Co., 241 U.S. 257, 2A (1916).
But such cases can be distinguished on two grounds: (1) the statements were often
made with reference to the question of whether the cause could quali4- fur federal
jurisdiction within § 1331, see note 6 supra, which is a different question from whether
modification is allowable if there is special federal jurisdiction; (2) there were no circum-
stances calling for federal modification of ,tate law.
32. Cf. Davis v. Willey, 263 Fed. 588 (D.C. Calif. 1920), aff'd, 273 Fed. 397 (9th
Cir. 1921). The previous section can be found in 30 STAT. 549 (1893), 29 U.S.C. § 29
(1934).
33. The Act passed the House on August 10, 1937, 81 Co.G;. RE. 8t49 (1937), and
the Senate on June 10, 1938, 83 CONG. REC. 8729 (1938). Eric was decided April 25, 1938.
Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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was formulated and at least partially enacted at a time when a century of
judicial gloss on the referent "state law" (relating to state statutes of linita-
tion as well as other state jurisprudence) universally granted federal courts
complete freedom to apply federal equitable doctrines where state law con-
flicted with them.3 4 Consequently, the inference is even more plausible that
Congress intended, in using the term "state law," a result directly opposite
to the Court of Appeals' interpretation. At the same time, express use of
the term is subject to still another interpretation. The language of the section
clearly indicates an intent to allow suit by the trustee where the federal limita-
tion has expired and where an applicable state time period is more lenient.,
"State law" may have been inserted merely to clarify this intent. Under this
construction, express reference to state law is irrelevant in indicating the
extent to which federal courts should be bound by state decisions. Thus, in
the absence of congressional comment, 6 neither the term "state law" nor
the express reference to it in Section 11(e) can be construed as a "clear
mandate" for any interpretation of the section.
The distinction between state and federal derivation of the cause of action
likewise fails to support the result reached by the Court of Appeals. In so
far as such a distinction relies on Erie, it is irrelevant, since the Austrian
case presents neither the fact nor the rationale of diversity jurisdiction. A
suit arising under the Bankruptcy Act is one of special federal question
jurisdiction.37 Such jurisdiction is granted the federal court to further the
goals of a particular act, 38-here, the Bankruptcy Act. Diversity jurisdiction,
in contrast, seeks only to provide an alternate forum to avoid discrimination
against out-of-state litigants in local courts.3 9 The Eric doctrine, forbidding
discrimination in favor of foreign litigants, may be a sensible adjunct to the
federal policy for hearing diversity cases. But its reasoning is certainly not
applicable to non-diversity situations where rigid adherence to state law
might thwart the goals of special federal question jurisdiction. Indeed, the
Supreme Court has on various occasions, even since Eric, refused to follow
state decisional law when adjudicating state-created rights under non-
diversity jurisdiction. For example, in D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC,40
when a federal agency sued as assignee on a note, the Supreme Court
34. E.g., Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet. 1 (U.S. 1842) ; Kirby v. Lake Shore & Mich. S.R.R.,
120 U.S. 130 (1887). See MooRE, CommENTARY 310-15.
35. 1 CouLm oN BANKRUPTCY' 1187 (14th ed. 1940).
36. None of the very sparse references to the revision of Section 11(e) dealt with
the insertion of "state law" into the section. See H.R. REP. No. 1409, 75th- Cong., 1st
Sess. 20, 22 (1937) ; SE N. REP. No. 1916, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 14 (1938).37. Williams v. Austrian, 331 U.S. 642, 657-8 (1947). And see National Mutual
Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 595-9, 611-5 (1949). See note 6 supra.
38. See Schumacher v. Beeler, 293 U.S. 367, 371 (1934) ; Toledo Fence & Post Co.
v. Lyons, 290 Fed. 637, 641-2 (6th Cir. 1923).
39. THE FEDanEAisr, No. 80 at 536 (Heritage Press ed. 1945).
40. 315 U.S. 447 (1942).
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refused to recognize a defense available under state law against the assignor.
And bankruptcy courts hearing suits on state-created rights have also, in
case of conflict, been governed by federal equitable principles rather than
state decisional law. The nature of bankruptcy as !ets,41 the priority and
subordination of creditor claims,42 and the right to recover interest on
interest, 4 for example, have all been decided contrary to prevailing state
law, in alteration of the rights which existed between the parties before
bankruptcy. If the federal court has the power to modify state law in these
respects, the fact of the state origin of the cause of action is, per se. no
deterrent to federal modification of state accrual doctrines.
A more relevant criterion for deciding the extent to which federal courts
are bound by state law is to look more closely at other sections of the act
which the court is enforcing.44 Precedent clearl
- 
establishes the power of
federal courts to modify state law governing state-created rights in order
to implement the policies of a particular act. In these cases, the courts have
inferred broad congressional goals from sections of the act which, in them-
selves, were not specifically controlling.45 In fact, the Second Circuit's almost
parenthetical reference to the trustee as a mere assignee of the debtor may
be considered an overture in this direction, for cases under many ecuuns
of the Act frequently endorse a policy of restricting the trustee to the debtor's
rights before bankruptcy.46 However, under other sections of the Act the
41. Board of Trade of Chicago v. Johnson. 264 U.S. 1 (1924) (stock exchange seat
is "asset").
42. Prudence Realization Corp. v. Gist, 3111 U.S. 39 (1942).
43. Vanston Bondholders Protective Committee v. Green, 329 U.S. lSi, (,9t).
44. "The intention of the legislature, when properly ascertained, mnut go'em in
the construction of every statute. For such purpose the Nwhule statute must b eamincl.
Single sentences and single provisions are not to bc seklcted and contrued by themselves,
but the whole must be taken together." Pollard v. Bailey, 20 Wall. 52, 525-6 (U.S.
1874). See United States v. Alpers, 333 U.S. o'0, W1 (19-U); Er Parte tle Public
National Bank of N.Y., 278 U.S. 101, 104 (1928).
45. See cases and text at notes 40-43 supra. In the D'Oemdl case, the Court inferred,
from a criminal section of the Federal Re-Qrve Act which r.utlawt' d w'ilful false t-tatc-
ments to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. a policy of protecting th FDIC
from secret agreements. D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447, 456, 45S
(1942). In the Johnson case, reference to § ;Oka) of the Bankruptcy Act defining the
trustee's title was the basis for finding a scat on the Board of Trade to Le a bankzruptcy
asset. Board of Trade of Chicago v. John'un. 264 U.S. 1, 3 (1924 ). In the Geist ca-,,
the ruling was based on the general bankruptcy rule of equality gleantd from § IS (a .
Prudence Realization Corp. v. Geist, 316 U.S. 89, 93 (1942). In the I'anston case, the
Court's decision to apply equitable principles was groundcd on § 115, which gine
Chapter X courts the powers of a court of equity. Vanston Bondholders ProtcCtive
Committee v. Green, 329 U.S. 156, 165 (l46). See Note, Interaetihl o .Vational and
State-Created Interests in Non-Diersity Fields. 47 CoL L. Rn1'. b24 (1947).
46. Harrigan v. Bergdoll, 270 U.S. 560 (1920; Hummel v. Equitable Life Asbur.
Soc., 151 F.2d 994 (7th Cir. 1945) ; Isaacs v. Neece, 75 F2d 5t, (5th Cir. 1935).
The Second Circut's rejection of the lowcr cuurt's uaiformity argument in the :lustrian
case, see note 19 supra, on the basis that such uniformity was in any case precluded by
1953]
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trustee may also be given rights greater than those of the debtor in order
to further particular policies. 47 Here such an alternate policy may be found
in the Bankruptcy Act's specific grant of wide investigatory powers to the
trustee.48 There is evidence that Congress was particularly concerned about
uncovering corporate management abuses, like those alleged in A ustrian,
which were unlikely to be uncovered prior to reorganization. 49 Implementation
of this policy may well be taken to include a need for discovery provisions
to toll statutes of limitations. "0 Perhaps if these factors had comprised the focal
elements of the Court of Appeals' reasoning, the court might have reached
an opposite result in its disposition of the Austrian case.
Regardless of the outcome on its particular facts, however, Austrian v. Wil-
lianis stands as a particularly regrettable decision. Clearly, the Court of Appeals'
opinion cannot be supported upon its major premise of an express mandate pro-
vided by Section 11 (e). Nevertheless, since it is a case of first impression under
the section, Austrian provides leading authority for the misleading proposition
that federal courts are foreclosed from applying federal equitable principles
t6 modify state statutes of limitations in bankruptcy proceedings."1 On the
other hand, the opinion cannot be supported on its minor premise of the
the varying terms of years of state statutes, also shows that the court was thinking
somewhat in terms of bankruptcy policy. See Austrian v. Williams, 198 F2d 697, 702
(1952).
47. See cases cited note 45 supra.
48. BANKRUPCY Acr, § 167, 52 STAT. 890 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 567 (1946). These
powers apply only to reorganization trustees. To apply this argument to bankruptcy
proceedings, the court would have to look to investigatory powers of creditors in bank-
ruptcy, e.g., BANRuPTrcy Acr, § 55(b), 30 STAT. 559 (1898), as amended, 52 STAT. 865
(1938), 11 U.S.C. § 91(b) (1946). For these purposes, the bankruptcy trustee's rights
are identical with those of the creditor. See 4 COLLIER ON BANKCRUPTrc f 1 70.49-70.63,
pp. 1261-1316 (14th ed. 1942).
49. See Hearings before Committee on the Judiciary on H.R. 6439 and H.R. 8046,
75th Cong., 1st Sess. 163-4, 175-6 (1937); H.R. REP. No. 1409, 75th Cong., 1st Sess.
42-4 (1937); SEN. REP. No. 1916, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 21 (1938). See Williams v.
Austrian, 331 U.S. 642, 657 (1947). And see Becker, Fraud under the Bankruptcy Act,
23 J.N.A. REF. BANK. 124-6 (1949).
50. The Second Circuit repudiated this thesis on the ground that the conflict of
the New York rule with the federal principle is exceptional. Hence the court felt that
the likelihood, on a national scale, of escape of tortious corporate officers through such
a loophole is too small for Congress to have intended equitable modifications of the state
limitations statutes. However, New York gives rise to more proceedings in corporate
reorganization than any other jurisdiction of the country. 9 REMtINGTON oN BANKRLI'CV
iii (5th ed. 1939). But even assuming the court's factual correctness, its conclusion
need not follow, since the very purpose of equitable modification is to handle exceptional
cases.
51. But see the Fourth Circuit's reference to Section 11(e), prior to Austrian:
"[S]uit might be brought in a federal court of equity where, to say the least, it is
extremely doubtful that the [state's] statutes would be followed." Committee for
Holders of Central States Electric Corp. v. Kent, 143 F.2d 684, 687 (4th Cir. 1944).
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state creation of the cause of action. Nevertheless, emphasis on the state
derivation of the cause sets up a novel and totally irrelevant criterion for
the application of federal equitable principles in non-diversity cases. If widely
applied, such a criterion would tie the hands of courts in future attempts to
implement the Bankruptcy Act and other federal statutes. In light of the
desirability of restricting the Austrian case to its facts, if not overruling it,
the Supreme Court's recent denial of certiorari n2 seems unfortunate.
52. 73 Sup. Ct. 328 (1952).
